Bully and best friend – Russia's and China's depictions of Norway on social media 2023-2024

This report maps how known Russian and Chinese influence networks discussed Norway on social media from September 2023 to September 2024. It also assesses whether any of the coverage can be characterized as attempts at foreign influence. The report is part of a larger mapping of foreign information influence in the period 2023–2025 and builds on similar analyses related to the parliamentary election in 2021 and the municipal and county council elections in 2023.

The analysis is based on data from 1 709 known profiles on Facebook, X, TikTok, and Telegram, of which 1 039 are linked to the Russian influence network and 670 to the Chinese network. To identify relevant content, we used two search strategies: a comparative search key comparing how many times Norway is talked about relative to other countries, and an in-depth search key specifically targeting Norway and Norwegian affairs. The profiles are sorted into three categories: official government communication, state-controlled media, and proxy sources.

The Russian influence network mentions Norway in 12 300 posts, averaging 31 posts per day. This places Norway in 50th place (up from 52nd place in 2023) in coverage compared to other countries. A significant finding is that 6 220 posts are written wholly or partially in Norwegian, primarily on Telegram. We assess this activity as attempts to undermine support for Ukraine and portray Norway (and the West) as hostile toward Russia. The Chinese influence network mentions Norway in 1 448 posts, averaging four posts per day. This places Norway in 78th place in coverage compared to other countries (up from 86th place in 2023).

While the Russian profiles frequently promote antagonistic narratives about Norway, the West, and Ukraine, the Chinese profiles are mainly focusing on positive messaging about China through the doctrine “Tell the China story well”. Norway is used as an example of successful cooperation in areas such as trade, technology, and climate. We also observe how Chinese actors use Norway’s recognition of Palestine as proof of an increased division between Europe and the US. The activity generally appears as ordinary government communication and biased journalism. However, we assess it as foreign influence aimed at strategically positioning China in line with China’s goal of global authoritarian dominance and the underlying doctrines to achieve this. We observe that both Russia and China show an interest in the Arctic, which is a relevant, but not surprising, finding from a Norwegian security policy perspective.

The report concludes that Norway does not appear to be a particularly high-priority target for either Russia or China during the examined period. The findings show, however, that Norway is a target, nonetheless, and is also used as an actor in narratives aimed at both Russian and international audiences. While Russian actors actively spread disinformation and critical narratives, often in Norwegian, Chinese actors try to create a positive impression of China. This confirms well-known approaches and reflects different geopolitical objectives and influence strategies. The findings are relevant for understanding how these actors might operate, should they attempt to influence the 2025 Norwegian parliamentary election.

The report was commissioned by the Norwegian government, and written by Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Analyse & Tall and Common Consultancy.